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Abstract
What makes countries engage in reforms of mass education? Mo-
tivated by historical evidence on the relation between military threats
and expansions of primary education, we assemble a novel panel dataset
from the last 150 years in European countries and from the postwar
period in a large set of countries. We uncover three stylized facts:
(i) investments in education increase following military threats, (ii)
the presence of democratic institutions is negatively correlated with
education investments, and (iii) education investments increase more
following military threats in democracies. These patterns continue to
hold when we exploit rivalries in a country’s neighborhood as an al-
ternative source of variation. We develop a theoretical model which
rationalizes the three empirical findings. The model has an additional
prediction about investments in physical infrastructures, which we also
take to the data.
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What makes countries engage in reforms of mass education? A common view
is that such investments are the flipside of democratic transitions. Absent
democracy, the elite denies the masses access to education in order to secure
its power, while democracy – a wider franchise or open electoral competition
– promotes policies for mass education. This explanation might look quite
convincing, and seemingly accounts for the history of educational reforms in
Europe starting with France. Indeed, Figure 1 (from Lindert, 2004), suggests
that public contributions to primary-school education rose sharply in 1880,
once France had completed its transition from the Second Empire to the
Third Republic, which clearly reflected a move towards greater democracy.
Figure 1 about here
However, another event precipitating the fall of the Second Empire is
France’s defeat against Germany in the 1870 Battle of Sedan. In the words
of Lindert:
“The resounding defeat by Prussia tipped the scales in favor of the
education reformers. Enrollments and expenditures accelerated
across the 1870s, with local taxation leading the way. The real
victory of universal tax-based education came with Jules Ferry’s
Laic Laws of the 1880s, especially the 1881 law abolishing all
fees and tuitions charges in public elementary schools.[...]While
national politics could not deliver a centralized victory for uni-
versal schooling before the military defeat of 1870 [...] after 1881
centralization performed the mopping up role” (Lindert, 2004, p.
112)
Eugene Weber’s work on the modernization of rural France between 1870
and 1914 suggests why military threats may spur centralized investment in
mass education (Weber, 1979). A highly disintegrated population that was
largely illiterate and spoke a multiplicity of dialects was to be transformed
into a unified people sharing the same patriotic values, a spoken and written
language, a set of moral principles, and a motivation and ability to defend
France in future conflicts1.
1As Leon Gambetta would say to the leader of the Breton forces: “I beg you to forget
that you are Bretons, and to remember only that you are French”.
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In this paper, we study historical panel data on education spending and
enrollment – for a subset of mostly European countries since the 19th century
and a much larger sample in the postwar period – to assess the correlation
between military rivalry (or war risk) and enrollment in primary education
(or the occurrence of educational reforms). Based on standard panel regres-
sions, we find that, conditional on country and year fixed effects, primary
education is positively and significantly associated with military rivalry or
recent involvement in an external war. Moreover, while the estimated co-
efficient on democracy (gauged by the Polity IV index) comes out negative
when we control for military rivalry, the interaction between the two vari-
ables is typically positively and significantly associated with education. The
coefficient on military rivalry remains stable when we control for the political
regime, suggesting that military threats are independently related to mass
education. The contribution of this paper is to unveil these new stylized facts
and to then offer a theory to rationalize them.
Similar empirical patterns hold when considering rivalries between a coun-
try’s bordering countries and third countries as an alternative source of vari-
ation. A country is more likely to perceive military threats when military
rivalries are rife in its neighborhood. Regressing a country’s primary educa-
tion on the rivalries among its neighbors yields results qualitatively similar
to our preferred specifications, which use direct rivalries as the independent
variable.
To rationalize our main findings we develop a simple model of state in-
vestment in education by the ruling group of a country which faces military
threat and needs to educate and mobilize the whole population in order to
improve its chances of winning the war. The model explains both, the pos-
itive effect of military rivalry on educational investment (the probability of
winning the war is increasing in the domestic level of education) and the
positive interaction between war threat and democracy. The intuition for
the latter can be explained as follows. Winning the war yields a return to
the domestic country, a larger fraction of which accrues to the opposition
group the higher the level of democracy. Now, suppose that the probabil-
ity of winning a war depends upon both the educational level and fighting
efforts by members of the incumbent and opposition groups. In those cir-
cumstances, the incumbent group has stronger motives to invest in education
if a war becomes more likely. Absent democracy, however, opposition-group
members do not benefit a great deal from the economy’s resources. There-
fore, they have weaker incentives to exert fighting effort than members of
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the incumbent group. If the efforts by the incumbent and opponent groups
are sufficiently complementary, this incentive gap may lower the prospects of
winning a war to such an extent that investments in education respond less
to a higher war threat in autocracies than in democracies.2
Our paper relates to, at least, three strands of research. As for the rela-
tionship between public-education investments and democracy, Lott (1999)
suggests that non-democracies could invest more than democracies in public
education as a means of indoctrination. On the other hand, Glaeser et al.
(2007) argue that education and democracy should be positively correlated,
as civic participation – needed to support transitions from dictatorship into
democracy – is positively related to education. But the evidence for a positive
relationship between education and democracy is mixed, at best. Thus, Mul-
ligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) present cross-country evidence indicating
that more democratic countries do not have higher levels of social expendi-
tures and, in particular, higher public education spending. More recently,
Murin and Wacziarg (2014) find that education fosters democratization, but
they do not find any evidence for a relationship running from the political
regime to education attainment. Bursztyn (2014) shows that poor voters in
Brazil prefer the government to carry out cash transfers, yielding immediate
income increases, instead of vesting resources into public primary education.
Also related to our analysis is Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), who develop
a model to explain why the ruling class may sometimes invest in education
even though schooling enhances political participation. Analogously, Galor
et al. (2006) theoretically argue that capital accumulation gradually inten-
sifies the importance of skilled labor in production and therefore generates
support in the ruling class for human-capital investment. Galor et al. (2009)
maintain that a higher concentration of land ownership typically discour-
ages the development of human capital enhancing institutions, in particular
schooling. Based on data for 27 countries and 70 years from 1870, Ansell and
Lindvall (2013) find that observed educational reforms reflect the resolution
of conflicting interests not only in politics but also in religion. However,
no paper in this strand of work looks at the effect of military threats in
democracies and autocracies.
2In particular, the model helps understand what is specific to educational investments:
namely, that the interaction between rivalry and democracy significantly affects educa-
tional investment as opposed to other measures of state capacity such as infrastructure.
The contrast between educational investment and infrastructure in this respect, is shown
in Table 7.
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A second related literature deals with the impact of wars on economic
and political outcomes. On the latter, Ticchi and Vindigni (2009) analyze
theoretically a mechanism whereby international conflict may trigger demo-
cratic transitions. Their modeling is motivated by a large amount of earlier
research in political science and political sociology, such as Giddens (1985),
and empirical facts presented by Dolman (2004). Another literature on the
economic impact of wars starts with Anderton and Carter (2001), Blomberg
and Hess (2006), and Glick and Taylor (2005). More recent research by
Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008a,b) and by Acemoglu and Yared (2009)
evaluates the extent to which wars reduce trade flows. However, this re-
search does not generally investigate the links between wars and investment
in education.
A third strand of work deals with state capacity. Hintze (1975) and Tilly
(1975), preceding many others, provide historical accounts on the importance
of wars for state building. More recently, an economic literature summarized
and extended in Besley and Persson (2011) considers theoretically invest-
ments in fiscal and legal capacity, and finds positive correlations between past
wars and current state capacity in international panel data. Thies (2004),
using the same measure as we do, shows that military rivalries raise fiscal
capacity in postcolonial developing states. Scheve and Stasavage (2011) in-
vestigate the links between wars, democracy, and estate taxation in about
20 countries since 1816 and find that democracy does not systematically in-
fluence top rates of estate taxation, whereas wars with mass mobilizations
significantly raise these rates. Analogously, we find a correlation between
current educational investments and past wars or military rivalry, while – in
parallel to Scheve and Stasavage – the correlation between wars and democ-
racy is more tenuous. In addition, we find that the effect of military rivalry on
educational investment is larger in democracies, a finding that may be quite
specific to education. In contrast to this literature, we treat state capacity
as exogenous, both in the theory part and in our empirical analysis. More
recently, Alesina and Reich (2015) look at how policies of nation-building,
in particular education, can help homogenize a country’s population. They
point at two channels whereby education and other nation-building policies
can achieve that goal: a soft channel, by facilitating communication among
citizens with different local languages and cultures, and a coercive chan-
nel, by prohibiting local cultures. Then, they argue that democracies and
non-democracies differ with respect to both, how much to invest in homog-
enization and also the extent to which the coercive channel should be used.
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But they do not link policies of nation building to military threat, and to
its interplay with democracy. Finally, to explain the acceleration in state-
building in Europe after 1500, Gennaioli and Voth (2016) develop a model
of the relationship between the importance of money for winning a war and
the degree of centralization in tax collection. That the importance of money
in wars rose sharply after 1500, is explained by the authors as the combined
effect of the introduction of gunpowder (which called for stronger fortifica-
tions) and the development of standing armies with firearms. While we also
emphasize the relationship between military rivalry and state investments,
our emphasis is on the relationship between education investments and the
interaction between military rivalry and democracy.
We have organized the paper as follows. Section 2 describes three his-
torical examples that speak to the relationship between military rivalry and
education reforms. Section 3 introduces our data, descriptive statistics, and
empirical specifications. Section 4 presents the econometric results and dis-
cusses their robustness to a variety of factual and statistical concerns. Section
5 spells out a theoretical model, which is consistent with the three key em-
pirical findings – in addition, the model has an auxiliary prediction, which
also finds support in the data. Section 6 concludes.
2 Lessons From History
While each nation’s history has unique elements that cannot be forced into a
unified framework, the examples of France, Japan, and China over the 19th
century show how military threats or rivalries can spur educational reforms.
Moreover, Japan and especially China illustrate the view that military threat
more than democracy per se is the driving force behind school enrollment,
although the comparison between France and China will also suggest that
the effect of military threat on educational enrollment is enhanced by democ-
racy. In each example, we give background on the historical context and the
debate that took place in a volatile international environment, the subse-
quent process of education reforms, and the outcomes especially with regard
to primary enrollment.
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2.1 Jules Ferry’s France
Background and Debate In 1870, French public expenditure on educa-
tion was lagging behind that of Prussia and other European countries. The
French education system was mainly private and largely religious. Teaching
was done by priests or by anyone who knew how to read, often in improvised
classrooms with poor amenities in the backyard of a farm. A large fraction
of registered children never attended school. The result was a population
with many illiterate or unable to understand the content of a text. In 1863,
7.5 million citizens (about a fifth of the population) spoke only local dialects
and no proper French.
Even prior to the Prussian war in 1870, elites knew that French education
had failed to promote national unity. Victor Duruy, appointed Minister of
Education in 1863 by Napoleon III, was advocating sweeping educational
reforms, better educational facilities, and more of technical education – plans
similar to those Jules Ferry would pursue some 20 years later. When Duruy
tried to convince the Emperor, he did not manage to gather enough political
support especially from a rural population heavily influenced by the Church,
so Napoleon III decided to let the project of his minister be defeated by the
legislature.
On September 2, 1870, Napoleon III was made prisoner at Sedan, and on
February 26, 1871, Germany took control of the French regions of Alsace and
Lorraine. This resounding defeat prompted the fall of the Second Empire.
After the Sedan battle, the debate about educational reforms would con-
tinue. Conservatives and the church saw Sedan as a punishment for France’s
infidelity to its traditions, while progressives saw it as a reflection of superior
Prussian schools and universities. However, the defeat spurred support for
the reformers:
“There was nearly universal belief among the French elite that
Prussia had triumphed because of the superiority of its celebrated
universities: a popular aphorism was that the University of Berlin
was the revenge for the defeat at Jena. French praise for German
education extended to all levels of the system. Journalists re-
peated the dicta that the Prussian elementary school teacher was
the architect of Sedan and that the modern secondary education
of the Realschulen had provided the scientific base for Prussian
military efficiency.” (Moody, 1978, p. 87).
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Despite the disagreement on the causes of military defeat, a majority
agreed that education had played a key role in Prussia’s rise to power and
that French education had to be reformed, not only to increase literacy,
but also to give new generations basic knowledge in arithmetic, history and
geography, and to
“teach Frenchmen to be confident of their nation’s superiority in
law, civilization and republican institutions. It should be consis-
tent with reigning social values, and thereby eliminate disruptive
conflicts and promote the unity of the classes. Since France no
longer enjoyed religious unity, it must forge a new moral unity
from a unified education that would teach civic morality based
on the principles of natural reason” (Moody, 1978, p. 88).
The Reform Process Jules Ferry’s laic laws enshrined the new principle
of universal education in the 1880s. Jules Ferry became Minister of Education
in February 1879. He abolished all tuition in public elementary schools in
1881; made enrollment compulsory from age six to thirteen in 1882; made it
mandatory for every village with more than twenty children at school age to
host a public elementary school in 1883; devoted subsidies to the building and
maintenance of schools and to paying teachers in 1885; and established an
elementary teaching program, together with monitoring provisions in 1886.
These so-called “Laic Laws” still characterize the French educational system
today. At the same time, a complementary infrastructure program – the Fr-
eycinet plan – was to facilitate access to schools. Millions of francs were spent
on road building to match the large amounts spent on schools: 17,320 new
schools were built, 5,428 schools were enlarged, 8,381 schools were repaired
(Weber, 1979). Enrollment and attendance in primary education steadily
increased.
In addition to wider access, the reforms transformed the content of ele-
mentary education: new programs emphasized geography, history, and dicta-
tion. The new history and geography programs aimed at conveying patriotic
values to new generations.3 From their very first day at school, children were
taught that their first duty was to defend the fatherland. Even gymnastics
3As for dictations, they were useful to teach the French language but, beyond that “the
exercise was a sort of catechism designed to teach the child that it was his duty to defend
the fatherland, to shed his blood or die for the commonwealth, to obey the government,
to perform military service, to work, learn, pay taxes and so on” (Lindert, 2004, p. 333).
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were meant “to develop in the child the idea of discipline, and prepare him
[...] to be a good soldier and a good Frenchman” (Lindert, 2004).
Outcomes Official statistics4 attest that school attendance rose substan-
tively in the decade after 1882. Primary enrollment rates went up from 12%
of the population in 1870 to over 14% in 1912. Literacy rates rose from 80%
in 1870 to 96% in 1912 (and the initial 80% figure is partly misleading, as
most “literate” children did not understand what they read prior to the re-
forms). Finally, the reforms appear to have increased the sense of patriotism
and national unity. Thanks to the Ferry laws,
“in Ain, Ardennes, Vendee, all children became familiar with ref-
erences or identities that could thereafter be used by the author-
ities, the press, and the politicians to appeal to them as a single
body” (Lindert, 2004, p. 337),
and in that respect Ferry’s efforts paid off during the subsequent mobilization
in 1914.
2.2 Japan in the Meiji Era
Background and Debate From the 17th century, Japan was ruled by
military lords (the so-called shoguns) of the Tokugawa dynasty. Education
was a privilege of the Samurais and centered on tradition and the study of
Confucian classics. From the mid 1850s though, Japan came under threats
by Western powers. In 1853, US Commodore Matthew Perry presented an
ultimatum: open up to trade or suffer the consequences of war. To add
credibility to this threat, American warships were sent to Japan and the
Trade Convention of Kanagawa was signed on March 31, 1854. Western
threats towards Japan in the second half of the 19th century acted as a
catalyst for educational reforms:
“In 1872, government leaders were haunted by a crisis of inter-
national proportions. [...] European colonial empires had spread
into the Far East, threatening the very existence of Japan as a
sovereign state. During the years of self-imposed isolation by the
Tokugawa regime [...], the country had fallen dangerously behind
4As reported in Moody (1978) and Lindert (2004).
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the West as the industrial revolution got under way. The rise of
Western capitalism and international colonialism posed a perva-
sive threat to Japan, as perceived by the new leaders. They were
determined to use any means necessary to transform their coun-
try into a modern state in order to preserve the political order
and the national sovereignty. Education on the Western model
was envisioned as an instrument to achieve that goal.” (Duke,
2009, p. 1).
The Tokugawa implemented various reforms in the early 1860s, but did
not go far enough to satisfy the Samurais. Japan fell into civil war and in
January 1868, the insurgents prompted Emperor Meiji, who had just taken
the throne, to announce an “imperial restoration”.
After this coup d’Etat, a debate emerged about education. Some wanted
to preserve the focus on Confucian classics to maintain interpersonal hierar-
chical relationships and traditional customs, while others favored introducing
secular Western science, mathematics and rationalistic thought to modernize
the Japanese society. The Western-oriented progressives eventually prevailed
over the Eastern-oriented traditionalists. Indeed, “observation of European
and American societies convinced leaders such as Kido Koin that mass school-
ing, like mass conscription, was a fundamental source of the economic and
military power of the West. Their initial models were primarily American
and French” (Gordon, 2003, p. 67). The newly founded Ministry of Educa-
tion sent delegates to learn about Western education systems, for instance
with the Iwakura mission of 1872-1873.
The Reform Process Thus, the leaders of the Meiji era decided on pro-
found reforms turning to mass education so as to rise up to the challenges
posed by the West: “mass compulsory education was a bold initiative, and
a risky one for the government” (Gordon, 2003, p. 67). Meiji leaders could
have decided to hold back from imparting literacy and potentially subversive
“enlightenment” to imperial subjects who were expected to follow orders.
But they consciously took this risk, concluding that an ignorant populace
would be a greater danger to their projects to build political and economic
power. Thus, military threats resulted in a shift in the “equilibrium educa-
tional institutions”. As Burnett and Wada (2007) argued,
“For the first time in Japanese history education was interpreted
as a tool in the push to modernize the nation, a point confirmed
10
by the then Minister of Education Mori Arinori: ‘Our country
must move from its third class position to second class, and from
second class to first: ultimately to the leading position among all
countries of the world. The best way of doing this is [by laying]
the foundations of elementary education’.”
The desire to unify the people after years of civil war and the sense of
urgency derived from perceived domestic and foreign threats explains the
radical steps taken by the Meiji leaders. They approached education as an
instrument to serve the state and were eager to follow what they called the
“Prussian notion of education” (Duke, p. 314).
Accordingly, in 1872 a new education system was instituted which de-
clared four years of compulsory elementary education for all children. As
explained by Burnett and Wada (2007), “in just a one-year period following
the Gakusei of 1872, 12,500 primary schools were established. Within the
next five years the number of schools doubled to a figure not surpassed until
the 1960s.” The move to mass education was completed by a national train-
ing system for teachers. The first teacher’s college was created in Tokyo in
July 1872, based on American principles of elementary-school instruction.
Outcomes Initially, reactions to the educational reform were mixed.
“Not everyone was so happy at the obligation to attend school [...]
In the 1870s, angry taxpayers reacted to compulsory schooling as
they had to the draft: they rioted. Crowds of people destroyed
at least two thousand schools, usually be setting them afire. This
represented close to one-tenth of the total number of schools.
The passive resistance of simply not going to school was even
more widespread. Rates of attendance for school-age boys and
girls stood at 25 to 50 percent of the eligible population for the
first decade of the new system” (Gordon, 2000, p. 68).
One might argue that popular resistance reflected a lack of democracy: peas-
ants neither identified with the emperor, nor with the new ruling class, and
therefore disapproved of the new compulsory nationalistic education. Simi-
larly, people at first tried to resist the military reform.
Yet, over time, the educational reforms yielded more and more of a re-
sounding success. Japan overtook most European powers with regard to
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primary enrollment per school-age child, which rose from 28.1% in 1873 to
98.1% in 1910. From 1865 to 1910, the literacy rate increased from 35% to
75% for men and from 8% to 68% for women. 5.
Successful education reforms certainly played a role in Japan’s unexpected
military victories in the 1895 war against China and the 1905 war against
Russia. Overall, the Meiji-era reforms further illustrate the idea that edu-
cation reform occur as a result of strategic military concerns. The Japanese
example is probably even clearer than the French one, in that military consid-
erations clearly took precedence over humanistic ones. Yet the initial popular
resistance may illustrate how a lack of democracy can reduce or delay the
effectiveness of educational reforms.
2.3 China and the Hundred Days’ reform
Background and Debate 19th century China offers yet one more illus-
tration of the role that military threat can play in prompting educational
reforms. But it also shows the fragility of such reforms in the absence of
democracy, thereby illustrating the complementary roles of military rivalry
and democracy in fostering educational enrollment. Throughout that cen-
tury, there was a debate in China as to how to reform the education system
(and notably the civil service examination) in order to incorporate the study
of modern science into traditional curriculums. The hope was that reforming
education would give China the power to stand up to Western colonizers.
This debate culminated during the Hundred Days’ Reform, although that
education reform was eventually abandoned.
In the first half of the 19th century, the geopolitical situation of China
was very similar to that of Japan. The Middle Kingdom was forced to open
itself to Western powers. The Opium wars of 1839-1842 and 1856-1860 and
the destruction of the old Summer Palace by British and French troops in
1860 attest to the delicate situation of China in the new global order. Several
Chinese officials started to argue about the need to adopt Western military
technology and armament, and consequently advocated a qualitative shift in
education, from the study of Confucian classics to modern science. But such
a reform would threaten the established order – for centuries, the civil service
examination had been based on the teachings of Confucius and ensured that
the ruling elite subscribed to a conservative Confucian world view. The elites
5See Gordon (2000) and Duke (2009)
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knew that reforming education might result in “losing the soul of China”
or “giving up being Chinese,” and, perhaps even more importantly, would
probably imply great changes to the social hierarchy.
The reforms in two steps Thus, during the second part of the 19th
century, if the Chinese elite pushed for educational reform, it did so gradually.
First, the view was that Western military technology could be mastered by
establishing shipyards and arsenals and by hiring foreign advisers. Arsenal
schools, first established in the 1860s by the Quing government, provided
applied training in Western science and engineering and produced Chinese-
language translations of important books in the natural and applied sciences
(see Cantoni and Yutchman, 2011). These reforms were part of the so called
“self-strengthening movement” and relied on the conviction that China would
learn from foreigners, and thereby catch up with them and finally surpass
them.
This belief was challenged by the unexpected defeat to Japan in 1895.
It seemed that China needed more than “self-strengthening” and the young
Guangxu Emperor ordered a series of reforms to bring about sweeping social
and institutional changes – a famous episode of Chinese history known as
the Hundred Days’ Reform. His advisers, notably Kang Yuwai and Liang
Qichao, recommended to move to a second stage of educational reforms,
with the creation of a “national school system” that would grant students
degrees and would replace the Imperial examination system. Consequently,
the Imperial University, also known as Beijing University, was founded in
1898. The creation of this university, with a curriculum geared towards the
sciences, was bound to have large repercussions on the whole Chine education
system: “This was not merely to be a university located in the capital, but
the Imperial university, the new creator of intellectual standards and norms,
the ultimate and official authority that trumped all education experiments
at the local level” (Karl and Zarrow, 2002, page 110).6
The partial undoing of the reforms A coup d’Etat was to be
staged by conservative opponents led by Empress Dowager Cixi in Septem-
6There was no doubt that “Liang Qichao’s reform for the Imperial University proved
terribly threatening to the conservative powers that be, who were unwilling to countenance
the idea that the Chinese intellectual tradition, and by extension the source of their own
power, was anything but sacred in nature” (Karl and Zarrow, page 113).
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ber 1898. The radical reformers were executed or forced into exile and
the Empress Dowager overturned the ambitious reforms promulgated by the
Guangxu Emperor, with one significant exception. The Imperial University
survived the coup, although the curriculum was modified: the pluralistic
approach to knowledge was limited, imperial edicts would be studied more
often, the Empress Dowager’s birthday and Emperor Guangxu’s birthday
would be observed, etc. In short, the advisers of the Empress Dowager de-
signed “an institutional practice in which ritual observance of political loyalty
played a central role” and “the Qing dynasty rose ever more prominently into
the sacred space they had formerly dominated.” (Karl and Zarrow, page 117).
Although Guangxu’s reforms were overturned by the Empress Dowager, they
served as a basis for other reforms which occurred a few years later, notably
with the suppression of the Imperial examination system in 1905.
2.4 Summing Up
The historical evidence from France, Japan and China illustrate how mil-
itary threats and rivalries may be important for purposeful investments in
primary education. Moreover, contrasting the examples of France on the one
hand, and Japan and especially China on the other hand, suggests that the
educational reform triggered by a military threat may also depend on the
political regime. In democratic France the reforms met with less resistance
than in autocratic Japan or in autocratic China, even if they eventually had
a larger effect on education in Japan. To further explore this issue, we will
look for an interactions between democracy and military rivalry in the data.
A positive relationship between military rivalry and primary education
enrollment could reflect different objectives of the rulers. These may in-
clude desires to (i) generate basic knowledge in mathematics or language,
(ii) promote group discipline, or (iii) transmit patriotic values. Our empir-
ical analysis in Section 4 will not be able to directly distinguish between
these alternatives. The positive effect of military rivalry on primary edu-
cation enrollment may also reflect the evolution of military technology over
time: rivalries and wars existed long before the 19th century without inducing
mass education reforms. But then industrialization has gone together with
the development of technologies of modern warfare and more complex war
strategies, which in turn raised the value of educated soldiers. Our empiri-
cal analysis will indeed show that the positive correlation between military
rivalry and education enrollment applies to countries that have reached a
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minimum threshold level of industrialization.
3 Data and Empirical Specifications
3.1 Sources and Variable Definitions
Education To empirically investigate the determinants of mass education
reforms, we use an unbalanced panel with annual data for 166 countries
between 1830 and 2010. Our main dependent variable, Enrollmenti,t, mea-
sures primary enrollment per 10,000 inhabitants in country i and year t, in
accordance with the UNESCO definition of primary schooling. The under-
lying data are drawn from the CNTS Data Archive of Banks (2011). In our
baseline regressions, we use primary enrollment as a continuous dependent
variable. Constructed on a per-capita, rather than per-school-age-child ba-
sis, this measure is affected by shifts in demographic structure: for the same
prevalence of schooling a young population will have a higher primary en-
rollment rate per capita than an old population. We therefore control for
population growth in the past 10 years to mitigate such effects. As shown
by the descriptive statistics in Table 1, the average primary enrollment rate
is 10.5% of the population over our pooled sample, with a large variation
across countries and time periods.
To test the robustness of our results, we also analyze the probability of
discrete education reforms expanding access to primary education.7
War Threats We measure war risk and military threats in two alternative
ways. As in the examples of Jules Ferry’s France and Meji-era Japan, a
7Reform is defined in two alternative ways. For the complete sample of countries, a
binary imputed reform variable is set equal to one in a given year if primary enrollment
grew by more than 10% over the previous 5-year period. When analyzing imputed reforms,
we collapse the data into five-year averages so as to minimize measurement error. For a
reduced sample of 14 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom)
over the period 1830 to 1975), a binary known reform variable is set equal to one in years
when any new law is passed, which extends compulsory education, lowers the cost of
education (e.g., abolish school fees for primary education), or increases the number of
schools (e.g., makes it compulsory for each municipality to set up at least one primary
school). The source for this variable is Flora (1983). There are 52 such reforms in the
sample.
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recent experience of external conflict may raise the perceived likelihood of a
new conflict and the salience of military concerns in policy decisions. Recent
war i,t is a binary indicator set equal to one if country i was engaged in an
external war in any of the 10 years prior to year t, according to the variable
“inter-state war” in the Correlates of War (COW) database. This database
also provides information on the outcome (victory or defeat) of past wars
and a (crude) estimate of the number of casualties as a percentage of the
pre-war population.
We always exclude for each country years during which it is at war from
the sample, as an ongoing war – as opposed to a latent rivalry – may severely
increase the opportunity cost of public funds. Perhaps more importantly,
data in times of war are likely to be unreliable.
This measure of war risk is, of course, completely backward-looking and
may therefore miss emerging threats without a history of militarized conflict.
Our core measure, Rivalry i,t, is less subject to this concern. This indicator
picks up whether country i has a strategic rival in year t, according to Thomp-
son (2001) and Colaresi et al. (2010). Rivalry captures the risk of armed
conflict with a country of significant relative size and military strength. It
is based on contemporary perceptions by political decision-makers, gathered
from historical sources on foreign policy and diplomacy. Specifically, military
rivalries are identified by three criteria: whether two countries regard each
other as “(a) competitors8; (b) a source of actual or latent threats that pose
some possibility of becoming militarized; (c) enemies” (see Appendix A for
details).9 We also create a measure of the relative strength of rivals, assessing
8“Most states are not viewed as competitors – that is, capable of “playing” in the same
league. Relatively weak states are usually capable of interacting competitively only with
states in their immediate neighborhood, thereby winnowing the playing field dramatically.
Stronger actors may move into the neighborhood in threatening ways but without nec-
essarily being perceived, or without perceiving themselves, as genuine competitors. If an
opponent is too strong to be opposed unilaterally, assistance may be sought from a rival
of the opponent. Other opponents may be regarded more as nuisances or, more neutrally,
as policy problems than as full-fledged competitors or rivals. [...] Actors interpret the
intentions of others based on earlier behavior and forecasts about the future behavior of
these other actors. The interpretation of these intentions leads to expectations about the
likelihood of conflicts escalating to physical attacks. Strategic rivals anticipate some posi-
tive probability of an attack from their competitors over issues in contention.” (Thompson,
2001)
9To our knowledge, the collection of data and coding of qualitative information con-
ducted by Thompson (2001) and Colaresi et al. (2010) is the most rigorous and compre-
hensive on rivalries to date.
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the probability of winning or losing a potential military conflict, by gauging
the ratio of their respective armies. To this end, we draw military personnel
numbers from the COW National Material Capabilities database.
The summary statistics in Table 1 confirm that Thompson’s rivalry vari-
able captures a wider range of situations that the past-war variable. The two
are positively correlated, but less than perfectly so: 15% of the country-year
observations in our sample are associated with a war in the previous 10 years,
while over 70% are associated with one or more strategic rivalries. It should
be noted that the sample for strategic rivalries is smaller as it only includes
countries experiencing a rivalry at some point in their history since 1830;
the estimation therefore draws on the within-country variation over time in
rivalries and enrollment. Among countries engaged in strategic rivalries, a
war had materialized in the previous 10 years in 23% of the cases.
Political Regimes For the political regime, we use the institutionalized
autocracy and democracy scores (the polity2 variable) in the Polity IV database.
These are themselves combinations of constraints on the executive, openness
and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and competitiveness of polit-
ical participation. The combined score Democracyi,t ranges from −10 to
+10, where a higher score means that country i at date t is more demo-
cratic. About 43% of the country-years in our sample have positive scores.
The mean score is −0.37 and the variance is 7.1, with strong variation both
within and between countries: although political regimes often change slowly,
about 36% of the total variance in democracy scores is due to the within com-
ponent. One question in our empirical exercise is whether political change is
an important driver of mass education beside external rivalry.
Covariates Finally, our regressions include a number of other covariates.
Military expenditures and total population are drawn from the COW Na-
tional Material Capabilities, with additional data from the World Develop-
ment Indicators (for the post-1960 period) and CNTS. As there is a break in
the series in 1914, we include pre- and post-1914 military expenditure sepa-
rately. Urbanization rates are drawn from the same sources and measure the
share of population living in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants in our baseline
regressions. We test the robustness of our results to thresholds of 50,000 and
20,000 inhabitants. Measures of GDP and government expenditures (per
capita) are from the World Development Indicators and CNTS databases.
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Other covariates used in robustness checks are introduced in context below.
Table 1 about here
3.2 Empirical Specifications
Our preferred econometric specification, used to unveil the new stylized facts,
is as follows:
Enrollmenti,t = α0 + α1WarRiski,t + α2Democracyi,t + (1)
α3WarRiski,t ·Democracyi,t + α4Xi,t + νi + δt + ui,t ,
where the variables multiplying α1 to α3 were introduced in the previous
subsection. Our main parameters of interest are α1, which captures the
predictive effect on enrollment of war risk faced by country i in year t, and
α3, which captures the interaction of war risk with the democracy index. As
explained above, military threat means at least one strategic rival in year t
– or a war in the past 10 years (i.e., between years t − 10 and t − 1). Our
main prediction is that α1 should be positive, whereas we are more agnostic
about the signs of α2 and α3.
We include a set of control variables Xi,t, country fixed effects νi, and
year fixed effects δt. Hence, the effects we estimate are identified from the
variation over time within countries of the right-hand side variables relative
to their world average levels. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are
reported.
After presenting the results from our preferred specification, we imple-
ment a series of robustness tests, considering alternative inference methods,
dependent variables, controls, and samples. We note that our results are not




Table 2 shows the results from our baseline estimation of (1) in the yearly
panel, with primary enrollment rates as the dependent variable. All spec-
ifications include 10-year population growth, to account for varying shares
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of school-age children in total population, as well as military expenditure
per capita, to control for the possibility that military spending may crowd
out education spending. We also control for urbanization rates in order to
net out the impact of modernization in general and the higher concentration
of schools in cities. Indeed, we find that high population growth rates and
high urbanization rates are consistently associated with higher primary en-
rollments, while military spending – holding constant external threats – has
a positive coefficient before 1914 but a negative coefficient afterwards. An
interpretation of this pattern could be that military spending and education
spending were two facets of state-building in the earlier period, while once
a certain level of expansion of the state has been reached, limited fiscal ca-
pacity restricts the ability to invest in education if more effort is devoted to
building an army.
Table 2 about here
In columns 1 through 3, military threats are measured by the presence
of an ongoing military rivalry. Column 1 shows that primary enrollment
is positively and significantly associated with military rivalries. The point
estimate is sizeable: almost a third of the standard deviation in primary
enrollment. Interestingly, the coefficient on the democracy score is negative
and significant. At the same level of military threat, autocracies invest more
in education than democracies. This finding runs counter to the median
voter view of mass-education reforms, which would predict education to be
positively related to democracy. The coefficient on military rivalry is stable
when we control for the political regime. It appears to go against a view that
rivalries only matter insofar as they foster political change and that democ-
ratization is really the main force behind expansions of primary enrollment.10
In column 2, which is our baseline specification, we add an interaction term to
check if the impact of rivalries on educational investments differs by political
regime and find that primary enrollment is more positively associated with
military threats in democracies than in autocracies. The coefficient implies
that being engaged in a strategic rivalry is associated with additional primary
10This is consistent with Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) who find no causal relationship
from democracy to primary schooling when they control for the level of development with
GDP per capita and average education of the population. Murtin and Wacziarg however
find a link from education to democratization. While our model is agnostic about this
direction of causality, it is not inconsistent with it.
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enrollment of 0.9% of the population in an autocracy with a Polity score of -6
(at the 33rd percentile of the distribution) and of 2.3% in a democracy with
a Polity score of 3 (67th percentile). We investigate the democracy results
in more detail in Subsection 4.3.
Additional Covariates In column 3, we include two covariates that may
affect investments in education. The relative strength of rivals is defined as
the army size among any strategic rivals, divided by the size of the country’s
own military. A higher value of this interaction variable signals a higher
risk of losing a potential war. The point estimate suggests that countries
with stronger rivals indeed have higher enrollment rates. We also control for
total government expenditures per capita on a reduced sample which does
not cover the earlier period. Our main results are unchanged, namely the
presence of a strategic rival is associated with higher enrollment in primary
education, and democracies have less primary education. This suggests that
war threats may have an independent effect on education investments, aside
from any indirect effect that may arise through investments in higher fiscal
(state) capacity.
Past Wars vs. Rivalries Columns 4 to 6 of Table 2 present the same set
of regressions, except that we replace military rivalry by the occurrence of
a war in the past 10 years. Primary enrollment is positively correlated with
the occurrence of a war in the past 10 years. Also, consistent with the results
in columns 1 to 3, autocracies invest more in education than democracies.
However the interaction term is insignificant or only marginally significant
in those specifications, as well as the severity of the recent war(s), measured
by the number of casualties incurred by the country as a percentage of its
pre-war population.
4.2 Plausibility Checks
The motive for investing in mass education in our narrative is that a more
educated population is more effective at fighting wars. In this subsection we
perform two plausibility checks, which support this narrative. The econo-
metric results are collected in Table 3.
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Education as a Means to Win Future Wars A first test is to look
at the relationship between education, rivalries and future wars. The first
four columns of Table 3 show the results of fixed effects linear probability
regressions. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is a binary indicator
for breakout of war in the next 10 years. As expected, being engaged in a
rivalry positively predicts future wars. The coefficient on primary school-
ing is also positive and significant, which provides additional evidence that
governments that (rationally) foresee high war risk may increase education
investments. Surprisingly, military expenditures are not found to be higher
in the run-up to a war once we control for rivalry.
Table 3 about here
In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is instead an indicator for win-
ning the next war, conditional on a war breaking out in the next 10 years.
In column 3, we only include as covariates primary enrollment, democracy
and military expenditure per capita. Here, we do find that the probability
of winning is positively and significantly associated with current education
levels. Perhaps surprisingly, military expenditures are not significantly asso-
ciated with the probability of victory. To control for asymmetries in military
capabilities, column 4 includes the size of the military (per 1,000 inhabi-
tants) also in the country’s largest rival. As expected, we find that a larger
army positively predicts victory, and a larger army in the rival increases the
likelihood of defeat. Importantly, the coefficient on primary enrollment re-
mains identical once we control for the mobilization of the population into
the military. Together with the historical evidence in Section 2, these findings
support the view that military threats spur investments in mass education in
order to build more effective armies. No other covariate, including military
expenditure, enters significantly in the regression for the outcome of future
wars.
Military Threats and Military Expenditure As a second check that
education investments are indeed driven by military concerns, we rerun our
baseline fixed-effects OLS regression but replace education with military ex-
penditure as a ratio of either GDP or total government expenditure as the
dependent variable. As seen in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3, we find the
same basic pattern for military spending as we did for primary education:
a positive correlation with strategic rivalries and a higher correlation in less
democratic countries.
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4.3 The Political Regime
Our estimates imply that democratic countries invest less in primary educa-
tion than autocratic countries, absent rivalries or war threats. However, the
gap between democracies and autocracies narrows at high war threats.
Possible Channels Political institutions may affect education policy along
several channels. As mentioned in the introduction, extending the franchise
might foster pro-poor policies, like publicly funded primary schooling. But
we find little evidence supporting this hypothesis. A prospective effect in the
opposite direction is that democratically elected leaders have higher turnover
– and thus shorter expected time horizons – than autocrats, making the
former less willing to invest in mass-education policies with mainly long-
term benefits. A third channel could conceivably run through the effect of
rivalries and wars on regime change: wars may affect education spending
mainly because they promote regime change, which in turn affects education
policy. However, our findings do not support this third channel, since the
direct estimates of military rivalry on education remain unchanged when we
control for the democracy score. Instead, our results suggest that war threats
or past wars tilt the preferences of ruling elites towards mass education. Even
if more schooling may raise the risk of autocratic leaders being ousted, the
long gestation lags in education may push this threat too far into the future
to affect current policy.
Disaggregating Democracy But our empirical measure of democracy is
very broadbrush, making it hard to understand the mechanisms at work. We
therefore disaggregate the democracy score into its two main components:
constraints on the executive and the openness of executive recruitment. In
particular, the effective time horizon of political leaders is best captured by
the openness of executive recruitment, while constraints on the executive af-
fect how much of the gains from educational reforms leaders can appropriate.
We then run our main specifications, letting these two aspects of democracy
enter separately on the right-hand side. To get a stronger signal, we de-
fine one dummy variable for each aspect: High constraints on the executive
(xconst greater than or equal to 4 in the Polity IV database on a scale of 1
to 7, indicating at least substantial limitations on executive authority) and
Openness of executive recruitment (xropen greater than or equal to 3 in the
same database on a scale of 0 to 4, corresponding to the designation of the
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executive leader through competitive elections).
Table 4 looks at the effect on primary enrollment with military rivalry
as the measure of war risk. The estimates in columns 1 and 3 show that
executive openness is negatively correlated with the enrollment rate, while
executive constraints are not. However, when we introduce interaction terms
between rivalry and each specific aspect of democracy in columns 2 and
4, both direct effects are insignificant, while the interaction with rivalry is
positive for executive constraints and negative for executive openness. In
columns 5 and 6, we run a horse race between the two measures with or
without interaction terms. The estimates show that the direct influence
of each component of democracy and the interaction terms remain similar,
albeit with a larger interaction term for openness of executive recruitment.
Table 4 about here
Thus, both aspects of democracy appear to matter in opposite direc-
tions.11 When we take interaction effects into consideration, the direct re-
lationship of both measures with primary schooling rates is not statistically
significant, but in the presence of military threats, the relationship between
high executive constraints, and primary schooling is consistently positive.
Conversely, high openness of the executive recruitment, which gives executive
leaders a lower stake in long-term investments, are associated with lower en-
rollment in the presence of rivalries. Overall the former effect dominates. The
disaggregated results therefore shed some light on the underlying mechanism
whereby political regimes influence mass education: the critical institutions
appear to lie in better accountability mechanisms and more extensive power
of the legislative branch. These findings will guide our theoretical framework
below.
4.4 Education and Neighboring Rivalries
We have documented a positive relationship between military rivalry and pri-
mary education, as well as a positive relationship between primary education
and the interaction between rivalry and democracy. Moreover, we have found
11This is perhaps surprising in itself: various authors have pointed out that the Polity
indexes do not display enough time variation to be significantly correlated with outcome
variables such as income (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared, 2008).
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suggestive evidence that education helps improve military effectiveness in fu-
ture conflicts. We caution against a causal interpretation of these stylized
facts: our OLS regressions could suffer from reverse causality or omitted vari-
able bias. For instance, a nationalist government that wants to strengthen
national identity may simultaneously choose to educate its citizens to foster
loyalty to the state, and create rivalries with other states to unite the nation.
As another potential source of bias, a country that tries to become more
internationally powerful might invest in education to increase its chances of
winning future wars and subsequently feel strong enough to engage in rivalry
with its neighbors. Thus, more powerful countries12 may have better edu-
cated populations and engage in more rivalries, which would bias upwards
the coefficient on rivalry in our OLS regressions for education. Conversely,
the same OLS coefficient could be downward biased. For instance, a “weak”
country may have low levels of education, and other countries might decide
to threaten it, creating a military rivalry.
Although we cannot conclusively estimate the causal effect of military
rivalry on education investments, in this subsection we present additional
evidence supporting the robustness of the stylized facts unveiled in Subsec-
tion 4.1. Specifically, we consider another source of variation in military
rivalry, namely the rivalries between the neighbors of each country. We first
show reduced-form regressions of educational enrollment on this new rivalry
variable. We then take the bolder step of using this variable as an instrument
for our previous rivalry measure, but we note that the exclusion restriction
is likely to be violated.
Measuring Neighboring Rivalry We construct a dummy variable for
each country, using information on the rivalries of all its neighboring countries
with third countries. More precisely, for country i, Neighboring rivalry i,t is
equal to 1 if in year t one of its bordering countries j is engaged in a rivalry
with at least one other country k which is not contiguous to i. Importantly,
we only take into account neighboring countries j and their respective rivals
k that do not have a rivalry with country i. Hence, Neighboring rivalry i,t
measures rivalries in the regional environment of country i, between countries
that have no rivalries in common with i. This measure of rivalry is much less
12“Power” depends on a series of characteristics, from economic development to internal
political stability, that we cannot control for in OLS regressions and is therefore a likely
source of omitted-variable bias.
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of a choice variable for country i than the rivalry measure used in the OLS
regressions. In the data, Neighboring rivalry i,t is indeed a good predictor of
the original rivalry variable, suggesting that when its regional environment
(exogenously) becomes more unstable, country i as well is more likely to be
engaged in a rivalry.
When it comes to sample selection, we construct the neighboring rivalry
variable for the entire sample, except for countries in Western Europe and
the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War.13 We exclude these regions a priori
because they were dominated by a series of strategic alliances driven by
the United States and the USSR. Moreover, they have limited predictive
powers on individual rivalries. When running the baseline specification on
this smaller sample, we find results similar to Table 2, so any differences in
results we find are not driven by changes in the sample.
Reduced-form Regressions Panel A of Table 5 reports the results from
reduced-form regressions. They have the same specification as our baseline
regressions in Table 2, except that we replace Rivalry with Neighboring ri-
valry and the interaction between Rivalry and Democracy by the interaction
between Neighboring rivalry and Democracy. The results are qualitatively
similar to the baseline results. In particular, comparing the results in col-
umn 2 with those in column 2 of Table 2, the three central coefficients all
maintain their signs and continue to be significant at the 1% level. The point
estimate is higher for the rivalry variable, but similar for the democracy and
interaction variables.
Table 5, Panel A, about here
IV regressions In a more demanding specification, we may use Neighbor-
ing rivalry to instrument for Rivalry. This instrument is imperfect, given
that a country could influence its bordering states, but we view the results
of the IV specification as a useful (descriptive) addition to the other stylized
facts documented in this paper.
To run the IV specification, we also need a second instrument for the inter-
action term between military threats and democracy. As in the reduced-form
regressions, we use the interaction of Neighboring rivalry with Democracy.
13Specifically, we exclude the years from 1950 to 1990. The results are robust to small
changes in these bounds.
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A valid concern is that the interaction effect between democracy and rivalry
is really capturing an interaction effect between rivalry and some other vari-
able. Our basic IV strategy does not address this concern, but in Table W4
in the Web Appendix, we add interaction effects with other variables and
show that the results are robust. The results are qualitatively similar when
we use lagged Democracy instead of Democracy.
The standard errors in all our IV regressions are heteroskedasticity-robust.
We also report various test statistics (F -test for excluded instruments, Anderson-
Rubin test, Cragg-Donald Wald statistic, and Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-
statistic14).
We run IV (2SLS) regressions with either one instrument and one en-
dogenous regressor (Rivalry) or with two instruments and two endogenous
regressors (Rivalry and Rivalry ·Democracy). The results are reported in
Panels B and C of Table 5. Panel B shows that the first-stage estimates have
the expected signs and that the instruments are not weak. Panel C reports
the second-stage estimates: the point estimate on Rivalry is larger than in
the OLS regressions15 and the interaction between Rivalry and Democracy
is positive and statistically significant, with roughly the same magnitude as
in the OLS regressions. Panel C presents additional test statistics, which
reject weak identification. However, if we do include Western Europe and
the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War in the sample, the instruments do
indeed become weak.16
Table 5, Panels B and C, about here
Overall, the reduced-form results and the IV results are in line with the
previously-documented stylized facts. We note that the IV results should
be interpreted with caution, because the exclusion restriction is likely to be
violated. Military threats in nearby countries may not be fully exogenous
14Stock and Yogo (2005) derive the critical values for the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic,
which is valid under homoskedasticity. The rule of thumb is to use the same critical values
for the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic, which is valid under heteroskedasticity. With
one instrument, the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values at different maximal IV sizes
are as follows: 10%: 16.38, 15%: 8.96, 20%: 6.66, With two instruments, they become:
10% : 7.03, 15%: 4.58, 20%: 3.95.
15A likely explanation for why the IV estimates are bigger than the OLS estimates is
classical measurement error of the rivalry measure.
16These regressions are reported in the Web Appendix – see Table W1. See Stock and
Yogo (2005) on weak instruments and biased IV estimators.
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to the country under examination, as there are spillovers. For instance, we
document in Table W2 that primary enrollment in the reference country
is a statistically-signficant predictor of future values of military threat in
the surrounding countries. Our results may therefore be part of a broader
regional pattern, where periods of warfare coincided with nation-building and
education investments.
4.5 Extensions and Robustness
In this section, we describe the results of a series of robustness checks to our
baseline specifications.
Table 6, about here
Clustering Table 6 investigates the robustness of our results to clustering
standard errors by country. In the presence of serial correlation, clustered
standard errors are necessary to avoid biased standard errors (see e.g. Duflo
et al. (2004)). Columns (1) and (2) show that, in the absence of controls be-
sides country and time fixed effects, the positive correlation between primary
enrollment and rivalry is robust to clustering standard errors by country.
The regression coefficient is still significant at the 5% level in column (2),
although standard errors increased substantially compared with column (1).
However, Columns (3) and (4) show that once our baseline additional con-
trols are introduced, statistical significance is lost with clustered standard
errors.17 Given the large set of controls and fi xed effects included in our
specifications , full clustering by country is a demanding specification. As an
alternative, in Columns (5) to (8) we consider standard errors clustered at
the level of countries over various time horizons, namely over 10, 20, 30, and
40 years, as opposed to clustering by country over the full length of the panel.
These specifications account for any pattern of serial correlation at the coun-
try level within the specified horizon. Statistical significant is retained for
all of these specifications, although standard errors increase as the horizon of
clustering gets larger. Given that our education variable is interpolated over
10-years periods, it was important to check that clustering by country over
a 10-year horizon leaves the results unaffected. Education is autocorrelated
17Column (3) of Table 6 replicates our preferred specification, also reported in Column
(1) of Table 2.
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at longer horizons, however, and a limitation of this paper is that statistical
significance is lost when clustering by country over horizons of more than 40
years. Collecting more data, covering more countries and for more years, is
an important agenda for future work, to help increase statistical precision
and improve robustness.
Education Reforms Instead of the continuous enrollment measure, we
analyze the effect of military threats on the probability of discrete educa-
tional reforms – see Table W3 (in the Web Appendix). Consider the effects
of strategic rivalry on Imputed reforms – i.e., a 10% or higher increase in
primary enrollment over a five-year period. Consistent with our predictions,
a strategic rivalry raises the probability of a large increase in primary en-
rollment. However, we find no significant impact of the military strength
of rivals. The Democracy score still enters negatively, and its interaction
with rivalry is positive, although not statistically significant. Finally, neither
population growth nor total government expenditure or military expenditure
show significant coefficients when democracy is included in the regression.18
When studying the effect of military threats on Known reforms, which
broaden access to primary or secondary education, we restrict our attention
to the subsample of 14 European countries for which these data are available
since 1830. The results are weaker than in the Imputed reforms regressions,
which is not surprising with such a small number of countries. In particular,
we find no effect of democracy and of its interaction with rivalry. But our
main findings still hold: a significant positive effect of rivalry (or rival’s
military strength) on the probability of observing a reform in primary (or
secondary) education, once we control for democracy.
Industrialization and Urbanization Expansion of primary schooling
and democratization are salient aspects of development. Another aspect
is the transition from a rural to an industrial and urban society. This may
lead democracy to be correlated with industrialization and urbanization. If
an educated military is more valuable in more industrialized countries, our
18We have also checked the sensitivity of our results to the threshold of education expan-
sion used to define imputed reforms. Specifically, we have used thresholds of 5% and 15%
expansions in the last five years, instead of 10%. The signs of the coefficients on rivalry
and on the democracy score are similar to those obtained with the 10% specification, while
the interaction term between rivalries and democracy is still non-significant.
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interaction between rivalry and democracy may pick up this effect. In addi-
tion, if industrialization relies on higher human capital, manufacturers may
want to lobby for education reform (Galor et al., 2009). To address these
concerns, we add measures of industrial development and their interaction
with rivalry as covariates to our baseline specification. Specifically, we use
the share of industrial activities in GDP (available for 1946-2000), and varia-
tions of the urbanization measure with the share of population living in cities
of 50,000 or more inhabitants, and the share of population living in cities of
20,000 or more inhabitants – see Table W4.
When doing so, our results on democracy are unchanged: the direct co-
efficient on Democracy is negative, its interaction with Rivalry is positive,
and both are statistically significant except over the reduced time period for
which the industry share of GDP is available. Moreover, as expected, more
industrialized and more urbanized countries have higher rates of primary en-
rollment when only the direct effect is included. Interestingly, we do find
that enrollment responds more to military threats in countries with a larger
share of industrial activities and a larger share of urban population. For a
country with a Democracy score of 0, the estimates in column 6 of Table W4
suggest that the effect of military rivalry on primary education becomes pos-
itive around a 15% share of population living in towns and cities (with lower
thresholds for more democratic countries). For instance, primary enrollment
would be predicted to be higher by 0.8% of the population where 25% of the
population lives in cities (at the mean) and by 2.5% of the population where
the urbanization rate reaches 43% (the mean plus one standard deviation);
again with higher values for more democratic countries.
These findings may also shed light on the potential mechanisms behind
our main result. Although we cannot test directly the three potential chan-
nels – acquisition of basic skills, group discipline, or patriotic values – the
positive interaction terms between rivalries and industrialization support the
skills channel. Rivalries and wars existed long before the 19th century – when
group discipline or patriotism were presumably already valuable in armies –
without triggering mass education reforms. But then industrialization has
gone together with the development of technologies of modern warfare and
more complex war strategies. These may have raised the value of educated
soldiers, since an army mastering basic skills is more effective at fighting
modern wars. Our results should thus be interpreted as applying primarily
to the era of modern warfare.
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Additional Covariates and Sample Selection We perform several other
robustness tests on our baseline specification – see Table W5. We first in-
clude the index of ethnic fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2003), as well
as its interaction with rivalry. Ethnic diversity has been shown to affect the
amount of social spending and in particular education investment. We find
that more fractionalized countries have lower enrollment rates, and the effect
of rivalry on primary enrollment also decreases with ethnic fractionalization.
Yet, our main coefficients remain unaffected.
Then, we include the primary enrollment rate of the rival. Consistent
with our intuition, countries increase their enrollment rates more when their
rivals have more educated populations, and therefore presumably more effec-
tive armies.19 Also, we add 10-year lagged enrollment to control for initial
conditions. As expected, primary enrollment displays high serial autocorre-
lation, but our main coefficient of interest on rivalry is unchanged. We also
check that our results do not reflect an entirely European story by exclud-
ing Western Europe from the sample. Again, our results are robust to this
change, and the coefficients on rivalry actually increase.
Moreover, we account for the possibility that country-specific factors may
vary nonlinearly over the sample period, by interacting country fixed effects
with dummies for before and after 1950. Our main result on military rivalry
does hold up.
Alternative Dependent Variable We have performed other robustness
tests as well – see Table W6. One is to compare our baseline results with
those obtained with an alternative measure of education, namely education
attainment from the Barro-Lee (2010) data set, available at five-year intervals
for the postwar period only. We run the specifications in (1), using as the
dependent variable the amount of primary education achieved by adults in
the 15-19 age span at year t+5, starting in 1950. Since education attainment
is defined per person of the relevant age group, we do not need to control for
population growth in these specifications. We find similar results to those in
Table 2 – a (weakly) positive effect of rivalry, a negative effect of democracy,
and a positive interaction term. The results are somewhat weaker with the
19Interestingly, the direct coefficient on rivalry turns negative when we control for the
education of rivals, which suggests that facing weaker, less skilled potential enemies actu-
ally acts as a disincentive to invest in one’s own primary education. However the overall
effect of rivalry (for a rival of equal military size) turns positive at a fairly low level of the
rival’s enrollment, of around 750 per 10,000.
30
recent occurrence of an external war as the threat variable, but the positive
effect of a recent war is significant.
4.6 Summary of Empirical Findings
Taken together, our empirical results provide a robust novel stylized fact: in
the wake of increased strategic rivalry (or in reaction to past wars), countries
invest more in mass education. Everything else equal, democracies invest
less in primary education than do autocracies. But the interaction between
democracy indicators and military rivalry appears to be positive, especially
when democracy is measured by constraints on the executive.
5 A Simple Theory
In this section, we lay out a formal model in which public education plays a
key role in the efficient operation of the military. The model is constructed
so as to be consistent with our main empirical findings and thus helps us
interpret them. In addition, the model has an auxiliary prediction, which we
also confront with data.
Basic Setup The formal model we develop borrows in spirit from the
state-capacity framework of Besley and Persson (2009, 2011), from the voter-
participation models by Feddersen and Sandroni (2002) and Coate and Con-
lin (2004), and from the analysis in Ticchi and Vindigni (2009) of fighting
incentives across different political regimes.
Consider a society, where population is normalized to unity and divided
into two equally large and homogenous groups (with regard to education)
of risk-neutral individuals, J = I, O. There are two time periods. Output
per capita in each period – equal to total resources and the tax base – is
exogenous, constant over time, normalized to 1
2
y(e), and non-decreasing in
the level of public education e with y(e) = 1 + βe.
All consumption takes place at the end of the second period. One of
the groups serves as the incumbent in both periods (thus there is no polit-
ical turnover). Among political institutions, we focus on the constraints on
the executive as the empirical findings are a bit stronger for this aspect of
democracy. These constraints are modeled as a share of output δ that the
incumbent group, I, must grant to the opposition group, O – thus, a higher
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value of δ captures stronger constraints (protecting the opposition group from
discretionary redistribution).
A war can occur in period 2 with exogenous probability p. For simplicity,
if a war is lost all (accumulated) income perishes from the country as a whole
– i.e., from both groups.
Education and the Probability of Winning The probability q of win-
ning a war, once it has broken out, depends on individual effort choices by the
members of each group in period 2. Specifically, each individual can expend
a unit of effort at a utility cost, which is decreasing in the level of education
e. We assume a very simple cost function x
e
, where x is individual-specific
and uniformly distributed on [0, 1] in each group.20 Any individual in group





is a rule set by group J members that – if followed by all other members
of the group – maximizes the group’s aggregate utility (in Feddersen and
Sandroni’s language, each individual member of group J wants to ”do her
part” to maximize the group’s utility).
The conditional probability of winning the war depends on the shares of



















where we assume that α < 1. This formulation assumes that (aggregate)
efforts of the two groups are complements. This could be for geographical
reasons: if the two groups inhabit different parts of the country’s territory,
effort is needed along different parts of the border. Alternatively, the two
groups might represent a dominant elite from which officers are drawn and
a large non-elite from which common soldiers are drawn: again, effort is
needed from both groups. We see this assumption as reflecting an important
20We abstract from the possibility that higher primary education might also give better
outside options to people who previously had no education, which in turn would tend to
increase – not decrease – military costs. However, this is not a major concern to understand
empirical patterns during the period that we study, since the overwhelming majority of
countries in our sample enforced military conscription. Useful references on this topic
include the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/mil con-military-conscription)
32
distinguishing feature of the technology of modern wars – say after after 1820
– compared to those in earlier periods.
The level of public education is chosen by the incumbent group in period
1. It can augment the initial education level, normalized at zero, by invest-
ment e in education at cost C(e) = eγ, where γ > 1. We study this choice of
education below.
Timing The timing of the model is as follows
1. In period 1, the incumbent makes investment e in future education
2. At the beginning of period 2, a war with a foreign power erupts with
probability p.
3. If war has erupted, members of each group choose the behavioral rule
for effort choice, thus setting ωI and ωO. Individual members of each
group observe the individual component of their effort cost x and then
choose whether to expend one unit of effort at cost x
e
.
4. An ongoing war is won with probability q.
5. If no war has erupted or a war has been won, the incumbent group
consumes a share 1 − δ of output y(e), while the opposition group
consumes δy(e). After a lost war, the consumption of both groups is
zero.
To analyze the model, we proceed by backward induction, starting from
the effort choices at stage 3 and going back to the education choice at stage
1. For simplicity, we assume no time discounting.
Equilibrium Efforts Without a behavioral rule for effort choice, individ-
uals would face a severe free-rider problem similar to the problem of voter
participation. In our setting, individuals choose to expend effort when their
utility cost is low enough. In analogy with the analyses in Feddersen and
Sandroni (2002) and Coate and Conlin (2004), we assume that group mem-
bers choose the behavioral rule that maximizes the expected payoff to the
group: i.e., expected consumption minus the group-wide cost of effort.
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2−α and ωI = ((1− δ)y(e)e)
1
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Equilibrium Education Moving back to period 1, the incumbent group
chooses education investment e to
max
e
[(1− p) + pq∗(e, δ)][(1− δ)y(e)− C(e)] ,
where the term in the first bracket is the probability that the war is not lost,
and the second bracket is the incumbent’s share of output less the cost of
investment. The corresponding first-order condition is:




where y′(e) = β ≥ 0. Using this and (2), we obtain

















This equation determines the equilibrium level of education e as a function
of the parameters (δ, β, p). For γ sufficiently large, the equilibrium e is suffi-
ciently small that q∗(e, δ) lies strictly between 0 and 1, as claimed earlier.
21Note that we are implicitly assuming an interior solution q∗ ∈ (0, 1). This in turn is
guaranteed by assuming γ sufficiently large, which in turn implies that the equilibrium e
is sufficiently small.
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Comparative Statics Performing comparative statics on (3) gives us:
Prediction 1 For δ sufficiently small, α < 1, γ large enough (to avoid
corners), and β > 0, equilibrium investment in education e is:
1. increasing in the risk of war, p
2. positively affected by the interaction between democracy δ and the
risk of war p






> 0, and ∂e
∂δ pp=0 < 0.
















> > (1− δ)β
when δ is sufficiently small and α < 1.






























But one can verify that
∂
∂δ












where the first term on the right-hand side remains bounded when δ → 0
whereas the second term becomes arbitrarily large provided α < 1.
Finally, Part 3 follows from the fact that the right-hand side of (3) is
unambiguously decreasing in δ for p = 0 and for β > 0.
Consistency with the Empirical Findings Parts 1-3 of Prediction 1
are obviously consistent with the three main findings reported in Section 4.
Intuitively, democracy has a direct negative effect on the motives to invest
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in education, because stronger constraints on the executive reduce the in-
cumbent’s residual claim on the additional output generated by education.22
For the effect of war threat and the positive interaction between war threat
and democracy, the intuition goes as follows. Society’s income is (partly)
expropriated if a war is lost to a foreign power. The probability of winning a
war depends upon both the educational level and fighting efforts by members
of the incumbent and opposition groups. In these circumstances, the incum-
bent group has stronger motives to invest in education if a war becomes more
likely. Absent some executive constraints, however, opposition-group mem-
bers do not benefit a great deal from the economy’s resources. Therefore,
they have weaker incentives to exert fighting effort than members of the in-
cumbent group – this mechanism is similar to the one in Ticchi and Vindigni
(2009). If the efforts by the incumbent and opponent groups are sufficiently
complementary (α < 1), this incentive gap may lower the prospects of win-
ning a war to such an extent that investments in education respond less to a
higher war threat in autocracies than in democracies.23
An Auxiliary Prediction The unverifiable and complementary decisions
on fighting effort by the two groups drive the model’s positive interaction
effect between military threats and democracy. In the case of physical in-
vestments, their contribution to military success presumably depend less on
such unverifiable efforts. By this logic, we can state an auxiliary prediction:
Prediction 2 Military rivalry might affect other measures of state capac-
ity such as infrastructure, but then the interaction between rivalry and
democracy should not be significant.
22A potentially counteracting effect, pointed out by a referee, is that more democracy
already in period 1 should constrain the incumbent to align herself more with the median
voter’s incentives to invest in education. This in turn might result in more educational
investment. We are ignoring this effect by assuming that educational investment is decided
by an incumbent in period 1, no matter the constraint on the executive at that date: in our
model democracy affects surplus sharing but not who decides about education. However,
our regressions suggest that, if any, such counteracting effect of democracy would be
dominated. Moreover, we think that our model captures the reality of most representative
democracies where, once elected, politicians still enjoy a large degree of discretion over
public investment policy.
23Note again that the conclusions change dramatically if α = 1. Thus our conclusions
rely on the pivotal assumption that war efforts from the opposition group are indispensable:
this captures war technology in the 19th century as opposed to the medieval period.
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Testing Prediction 2 We confront Prediction 2 with data on the length
of paved roads from Calderón and Servén (2010), which covers 97 coun-
tries over the period 1960-2000. Table 6 shows the results of estimating our
main baseline specification with the yearly percentage change in the length
of paved roads as the left-hand side variable. While military rivalries still
drive this type of investment, we find no effect – neither directly nor through
the interaction term – of the political regime on road-building.
Table 7 about here
6 Conclusion
We have argued that military rivalry is an important factor behind countries’
decisions to invest in mass primary education. If anything, democratization
seems to have a negative direct effect on such investments, although primary
enrollment appears to respond more to military threats in democracies than
in autocracies.
Our approach could profitably be extended in several directions. One
would be to look at the effect of military rivalry on other types of public
investments, not just primary education (and road expenditure). Some pre-
liminary regressions using Barro-Lee data on secondary-school enrollment
suggest a positive correlation between this variable and military rivalry, at
least when restricting attention to countries with high per-capita GDP. One
could also look at how much current or past military rivalry affects future
fiscal capacity following the lead of Tilly (1975) and, more recently, Besley
and Persson (2009).
A second extension would be to investigate if other forms of rivalry – for
example cross-country competition in product markets, or the importance of
international benchmarking, e.g., as induced by cross-country performance
in PISA or Shanghai evaluations – have a similar effect as military rivalry on
educational enrollment and other types of public investments.
A third extension could be to look at different types of conflicts. One
could look more closely at the correlation between enrollment and past wars,
and in particular to distinguish between wars won and lost. Preliminary
regressions show a positive correlation between primary enrollment and both
a lost war and a won war over the past 10 years, with a stronger correlation
if the war was won. This finding goes against the view that past wars might
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favor future education investments because defeats weaken incumbent elites
that might oppose mass education, though it could be linked to the scarcity
of public funds if states’ financial resources are more depleted after defeats
than after victories.
A fourth extension would be to consider not only the size of primary en-
rollment, but also the governance of primary (and secondary) schools. Recent
work by Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer (2013) distinguishes vertical and horizon-
tal school pedagogy, where the former relies heavily upon taking notes from
the teacher, whereas the latter involves group interactions among students.
One conjecture is that primary-education reforms with their roots in military
rivalry are more likely to be associated with vertical systems.
Investigating these and other extensions is left for future research.
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A Data Appendix: Strategic Rivalries
Thompson (2001) lists the following qualitative coding rules to define strate-
gic rivalries and their duration for the period 1816-1999:
1. “Strategic rivals must be independent states, as determined by Gled-
itsch and Ward’s (1999) inventory of independent states.
2. Beginning and ending dates are keyed as much as possible to the timing
of evidence about the onset of explicit threat, competitor, and enemy
perceptions on the part of decision-makers. Historical analyses, for
instance, often specify that decision-makers were unconcerned about
a competitor prior to some year just as they also provide reasonably
specific information about the timing of rapprochements and whether
they were meaningful ones or simply tactical maneuvers. (...)
As a general rule, the competitor criterion restricts rivalries to their own
class within the major-minor power distinction. Major (minor) power
rivalries are most likely to involve two major (minor) powers. Definitely,
there are exceptions to this rule. Major-minor power rivalries emerge
when minor powers become something more than nuisances in the eyes
of major power decision-makers. Capability asymmetry may still be
quite pronounced but that does not mean that the major power is in a
position to, or is inclined toward, the use of its capability advantage.
(...)
3. No minimal duration is stipulated in advance (...)
4. Various constituencies within states may have different views about
who their state’s main rivals are or should be. Unless they control the
government, constituency views are not considered the same as those of
the principal decisionmakers. If the principal decision-makers disagree
about the identity of rivals, the operational problem then becomes one
of assessing where foreign policy-making is most concentrated. (...)
5. If two states were not considered rivals prior to the outbreak of war,
they do not become rivals during the war unless their rivalry extends
beyond the period of war combat. This rule is designed to avoid com-
plications in assessing the linkages between rivalry and intensive forms
of conflict. (...)
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6. One needs to be especially skeptical about dating rivalry terminations.
Some rivalries experience short-lived and highly publicized rapproche-
ments that turn out to be less meaningful than one might have thought
from reading the relevant press accounts at the time. Some rivalries
enter long periods of hibernation only to erupt suddenly as if nothing
had changed. All of these situations may share the outward appear-
ance of rivalry termination. What needs to be manifested is evidence
of some explicit kind of a significant de-escalation in threat perceptions
and hostility. (...)
7. The most valuable sources for information pertinent to identifying
strategic rivalry are political histories of individual state’s foreign policy
activities.”
Colaresi et al. (2010) further refine the data to distinguish between three
types of rivalries: spatial, where rivals contest the exclusive control of a
territory; positional, where rivals contest relative shares of influence over
activities and prestige within a system or subsystem; and ideological, where
rivalscontest the relative virtues of diffrent belief systems relating to political,
economic or religious activities.
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B Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics (updated)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Primary enrollment per 10,000 7125 1048.971 534.812 1 3168
Rivalry 4995 0.713 0.453 0 1
War in past 10 years 7258 0.147 0.354 0 1
At war 6738 0.047 0.211 0 1
Democracy 7222 -0.377 7.111 -10 10
Openness of executive 6973 3.235 1.388 0 4
Constraints on executive 6973 3.906 2.385 1 7
Population growth (10 yrs) 4972 19.381 15.216 -60.424 207.327
Military expenditure (p.c.) (1) 7258 0.114 0.350 0 5.314
Military expenditure (p.c.) (2) 7258 41.652 203.051 0 7398.568
Military expenditure / GDP 4245 4.232 5.864 0 140.782
Military exp. / Government exp. 4895 22.744 24.147 0 409.671
Urbanization (100,000) 7219 14.278 13.779 0 100
Urbanization (50,000) 6559 18.040 16.474 0 384.7
Urbanization (20,000) 6314 24.852 18.500 0 122.6
Industry share of GDP 3880 26.657 14.213 0 85
Ethnic fractionalization 6907 39.741 25.306 0 93.017
Note: Unbalanced panel of 137 countries over the period 1830-2001. Military expenditure per capita
(1) before 1914 in British pounds, set to zero after 1914; (2) after 1914 in US dollars, set to zero before
1914.
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Table 2: Primary Enrollment and War Risk (updated)
Primary enrollment per 10,000
Strategic Rivalry War in previous 10 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 160.321*** 180.098*** 101.704***
(21.755) (23.313) (24.567)
Democracy -2.876* -13.076*** -7.776*** -7.523*** -7.861*** -4.881***
(1.477) (2.284) (2.484) (1.300) (1.336) (1.463)
Rivalry*Democracy 15.616*** 1.961
(2.500) (2.407)
Rel. army of rivals 2.083**
(0.950)
War in 75.808*** 73.778*** 98.977***
previous 10 years (16.900) (17.328) (16.145)




Urbanization 12.446*** 11.902*** 10.923*** 16.554*** 16.628*** 11.672***
(1.322) (1.279) (1.480) (1.102) (1.107) (1.045)
Population growth 8.160*** 8.118*** 4.604*** 6.775*** 6.789*** 4.768***
(1.143) (1.116) (0.921) (0.808) (0.802) (0.719)
Military expenditure p.c. 189.300*** 178.482*** 209.813*** 218.766*** 218.344*** 225.617***
before 1914 (66.703) (64.325) (65.444) (63.822) (63.671) (44.397)
Military expenditure p.c. -0.739*** -0.726*** -0.317*** -0.891*** -0.886*** -0.389***
after 1914 (0.126) (0.125) (0.093) (0.129) (0.129) (0.080)
Govt expenditure / GDP -0.116 0.416
(0.392) (0.352)
Observations 3140 3140 1830 4364 4364 2948
R-squared 0.762 0.767 0.856 0.738 0.738 0.824
Notes: All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets.
***p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. In columns (1) to (3) war risk is measured by the existence of one or
more strategic rivalries according to the Thompson (2001) classification. In columns (4) to (6) war risk is
measured by the occurrence of a war involving the country in the previous 10 years.
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Table 3: Education and Probability of Victory (updated)
Probability of war Probability of winning Military expenditure
in next 10 years if war in next 10 years / GDP / Gov’t exp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Primary enrollment per 100 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.044*** 0.046***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
Democracy -0.002 0.001 -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.168*** -0.179
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.036) (0.161)
Rivalry 0.146*** 0.177*** 0.012 0.573* 8.021***
(0.015) (0.020) (0.056) (0.317) (1.654)
Rivalry*Democracy 0.115*** 0.297*
(0.038) (0.173)
Urbanization -0.001 -0.006* -0.006 0.014 -0.129*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.019) (0.076)
Population growth -0.001** 0.053*** 0.011
(0.001) (0.019) (0.043)
Military expenditure p.c. -0.053** -0.492*** -0.502***
before 1914 (0.026) (0.090) (0.091)
Military expenditure p.c. 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001**
after 1914 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Military size / Population -3.702
(3.005)
At war 1.470** 6.885
(0.577) (4.260)
Observations 4489 3140 817 715
rests
2028 2321
R-squared 0.353 0.391 0.813 0.804 0.599 0.452
Notes: All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***
p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the probability of
observing a war involving the country in the next 10 years. In columns (3) and (4), the sample includes
only countries which experience a war outbreak in the next 10 years, and the dependent variable is the
probability of winning this future war. Primary enrollment is defined per 100 inhabitants (instead of
per 10,000 inhabitants) for this table only. In columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is military
expenditure respectively as a share of GDP and as a share of total government expenditure..
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Table 4: Components of Democracy (updated)
Primary enrollment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 145.728*** 205.438*** 165.214*** 108.479*** 140.131*** 183.359***
(21.904) (37.383) (21.386) (22.227) (21.634) (38.172)
Executive constraints 87.237*** -23.216 126.861*** 3.555
(16.564) (34.460) (17.111) (33.172)
Executive constraints*Rivalry 142.098*** 168.506***
(36.851) (34.870)
Executive openness -82.047*** -26.524 -121.455*** -20.229
(18.112) (34.175) (18.042) (32.994)
Executive openness*Rivalry -78.943** -146.360***
(38.054) (37.742)
Urbanization 12.369*** 12.627*** 11.453*** 11.224*** 11.366*** 11.510***
(1.297) (1.290) (1.340) (1.309) (1.310) (1.258)
Population growth 7.869*** 7.825*** 7.862*** 7.896*** 7.582*** 7.524***
(1.127) (1.130) (1.098) (1.081) (1.112) (1.095)
Military expenditure p.c. 186.510*** 186.028*** 184.584*** 180.076*** 177.710*** 170.962***
before 1914 (65.551) (65.432) (66.858) (66.352) (64.623) (63.727)
Military expenditure p.c. -0.740*** -0.748*** -0.718*** -0.707*** -0.716*** -0.715***
after 1914 (0.126) (0.127) (0.126) (0.124) (0.125) (0.125)
Observations 3145 3145 3145 3145 3145 3145
R-squared 0.764 0.765 0.765 0.766 0.769 0.772
Notes: All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets.
***p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. ”Executive constraints” is equal to 1 if xconst is greater than or equal
to 4 in the Polity IV database, and 0 otherwise. ”Executive openness” is equal to 1 if xropen is greater
than or equal to 3 in the Polity IV database, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 5: Rivalries in Neighboring Countries
Panel A: Reduced-form Regressions (updated)
Primary enrollment rate
(1) (2)








Population growth 6.230*** 6.115***
(0.793) (0.758)
Military expenditure p.c. 210.618*** 211.708***
before 1914 (61.586) (61.698)
Military expenditure p.c. -0.837*** -0.807***
before 1914 (0.133) (0.130)
Observations 4237 4237
R-squared 0.749 0.753
Notes: All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***
p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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Table 5: Rivalries in Neighboring Countries
Panel B: First-Stage Regressions
Rivalry Rivalry Rivalry*Democracy
1st Stage (1) (2) (3)
Neighboring rivalry 0.131*** 0.129*** -0.461*
[0.024] [0.024] [0.249]
Neighboring rivalry*Democracy 0.0028 0.305***
[0.002] [0.025]
Democracy -0.002* -0.003* 0.276***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.024]
Government expenditure (p.c.) 0.000 0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Population growth -0.000 -0.000 0.024***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.004]
Military expenditure (p.c) 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Excluded Instruments Neighboring rivalry Neighboring rivalry Neighboring rivalry
Neigh. rivalry*Democracy Neigh. rivalry*Democracy
F-statistic of Excluded Instruments 31.10 17.04 76.26
Observations 3,760 3,760 3,760
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.838 0.838 0.839
Notes: All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***
p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. For country i, Neighboring rivalryi,t is equal to 1 if in year t one of its
bordering countries j is engaged in a rivalry with at least one other country k which is not contiguous to
i. The sample excludes Western Europe and the Eastern bloc during the Cold War.
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Table 5: Rivalries in Neighboring Countries
Panel C: Second Stage Regressions
Primary enrollment rate







Government expenditure (p.c.) -0.302*** -0.292***
[0.028] [0.028]
Population growth 7.135*** 6.460***
[0.700] [0.736]
Military expenditure (p.c.) -0.014 -0.035
[0.127] [0.129]
Endogenous Regressors Rivalry Rivalry
Rivalry*Democracy
Instruments Neighboring rivalry Neighboring rivalry
Neighboring rivalry*Democracy
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 23.86 37.60
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 62.154 30.190
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 31.100 14.652
Observations 3,760 3,760
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Notes: All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Road Investments, Rivalry and Democracy (updated)
% change in length of paved roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rivalry 2.400** 2.503** 2.477*** 2.522***
(0.968) (0.989) (0.948) (0.932)




Urbanization -0.161*** -0.169*** -0.168*** -0.194***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055)
Military expenditure (p.c.) 0.003 0.003* 0.003* 0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Real GDP 1.376*
(0.826)
Road length per square km -0.004***
(0.001)
Observations 2566 2542 2542 2542
R-squared 0.122 0.125 0.125 0.127
Notes: All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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C Web Appendix: Education and Military
Rivalry
Table W1: IV Regressions
Panel A: First Stage Regressions (updated)
(1) (2) (3)
1st Stage Rivalry Rivalry Rivalry*Democracy
Neighboring rivalry 0.107*** 0.113** -1.130***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.226)
Neighboring rivalry*Democracy -0.005 0.364***
(0.004) (0.029)
Democracy -0.007*** -0.003 0.389***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.028)
Urbanization -0.001 -0.001 0.036***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011)
Population growth 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Military expenditure (p.c) 0.015 0.016 0.676***
before 1914 (0.0186) (0.019) (0.198)
Military expenditure (p.c) -0.000** -0.000** -0.001
after 1914 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Excluded Instruments Neighboring rivalry Neighboring rivalry Neighboring rivalry
Neigh. rivalry*Democracy Neigh. rivalry*Democracy
F-statistic of Excluded Instruments 9.46 5.06 85.93
Observations 3013 3013 3013
R-squared 0.903 0.903 0.869
Notes: All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***
p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. For country i, Neighboring rivalryi,t is equal to 1 if in year t one of its
bordering countries j is engaged in a rivalry with at least one other country k which is not contiguous to
i. The sample includes all countries during the entire time period (including the Cold War, which was
excluded in Table 5). The F-statistic in Panel A and the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic and Kleibergen-
Paap Wald r F statistic in Panel B show that the instruments are weak.
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Table W1: IV Regressions











Population growth -1.374 -2.902
(3.413) (4.244)
Military expenditure (p.c.) 143.562*** 72.154
before 1914 (54.077) (67.992)
Military expenditure (p.c.) -0.364* -0.200
after 1914 (0.204) (0.262)
Endogenous Regressors Rivalry Rivalry
Rivalry*Democracy
Instruments Neighboring rivalry Neighboring rivalry
Neighboring rivalry*Democracy
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 148.71 92.38
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 21.26 8.63
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 9.46 3.97
Observations 3013 3013
R-squared 0.607 0.460
Notes: All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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Table W2: Future Neighboring Rivalries and Education
Future Neigborwar
(1)










Military expenditure (p.c.)before 1913 0.0212*
(0.0128)






Notes: All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***
p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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Table W3: Robustness: Education Reforms and Military Rivalry
Panel A: Imputed reforms
Logit for “imputed reforms”
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rivalry 0.271** 0.177 0.190* 0.379***
[0.119] [0.113] [0.113] [0.145]




Relative arrmy of rivals -0.005
[0.019]
Population growth. 0.009*** 0.004 0.004 0.003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Military expenditure p.c. -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1390 1299 1299 1163
Notes: All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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Table W3: Robustness: Education Reforms and Military Rivalry
Panel B: Known reforms
Logit for “known reforms”
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rivalry 0.522*** 0.531** -0.157 0.148
[0.085] [0.052] [0.237] [0.522]




Relative army of rivals 0.145*** 0.166***
[0.034] [0.034]
Government expenditure p.c. 0.000
[0.001]
Population growth -0.001 -0.000 0.009 0.009
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.013]
Military expenditure p.c. 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Observations 741 741 720 666
Notes: All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets.. ***
p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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Table W4: Robustness: Industrialization and Urbanization (updated)
Primary enrollment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 116.463*** -33.225 196.974*** -66.067 169.932*** -155.684***
(23.966) (39.836) (24.386) (41.922) (25.963) (46.247)
Democracy -6.494** -6.456** -13.200*** -4.672* -16.135*** -8.880***
(2.618) (2.635) (2.476) (2.715) (2.502) (2.613)
Rivalry*Democracy 3.774 3.257 17.066*** 7.426** 20.281*** 11.642***





% Urban (50,000) 3.321** -4.996***
(1.292) (1.656)
Rivalry*% urban (50,000) 10.939***
(1.425)
% Urban (20,000) 3.575*** -2.716**
(1.087) (1.305)
Rivalry*% urban (20,000) 9.389***
(1.198)
Population growth 5.412*** 5.581*** 8.253*** 8.331*** 7.904*** 7.923***
(0.980) (0.981) (1.191) (1.198) (1.199) (1.188)
Military expenditure p.c. 184.885*** 195.107*** 156.536*** 162.221***
before 1914 (67.169) (68.512) (60.658) (60.313)
Military expenditure p.c. -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.741*** -0.773*** -1.069*** -1.090***
after 1914 (0.083) (0.082) (0.169) (0.168) (0.182) (0.176)
Observations 1740 1740 2921 2921 2793 2793
R-squared 0.853 0.855 0.766 0.773 0.773 0.781
Notes: All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***
p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. ”% Urban (50,000)” is the share of the population living in cities of
50,000 or more inhabitants (in %) and ”% Urban (20,000)” is the share of the population living in cities
of 20,000 or more inhabitants (in %). ”Industry/GDP” is the share of industrial output in GDP (in %).
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Table W5: Robustness: Specification and Sample Selection (updated)
Primary enrollment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rivalry 254.349*** -197.831*** 88.757*** 317.320*** 88.537***
(64.904) (41.520) (18.492) (30.246) (24.288)
Democracy -4.986* -6.731** 1.869 -9.787*** -0.172
(2.556) (2.709) (2.263) (3.207) (2.908)
Rivalry*Democracy 1.426 8.301*** -1.966 15.445*** 1.534





Relative army of rivals 3.984** 1.219 1.291 1.701*
(1.627) (0.835) (1.238) (0.983)
Primary enrollment of rivals 0.259***
(0.023)
Lagged Primary enrollment 0.722***
(0.032)
Urbanization 10.235*** 9.819*** 4.112*** 9.434*** 7.410***
(1.413) (1.665) (1.125) (1.433) (1.556)
Population growth 6.045*** 7.064*** 4.421*** 5.227*** 2.400***
(1.050) (1.171) (1.014) (0.937) (0.733)
Military expenditure p.c. 91.768* 55.848* 14.746 28.583
before 1914 (48.128) (29.348) (19.840) (24.903)
Military expenditure p.c. -0.310*** -0.469*** -0.254*** -0.309*** -0.253***
after 1914 (0.080) (0.111) (0.073) (0.092) (0.094)
Observations 1717 2617 2604 2272 2617
R-squared 0.854 0.800 0.864 0.864 0.889
Notes: All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets. ***p <0.01,
**p <0.05, *p <0.1. Column (1) includes the index of ethnic fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2003)
and its interaction with rivalry; it covers only the post-1945 period. Column (2) includes the primary
enrollment rate of the largest rival if any. In column (3) ”Lagged. Primary enrollment” is the 10-year
lagged primary enrollment rate per 10,000 inhabitants. Column (4) excludes Western Europe. In column
(5) country fixed effects are interacted with before/after 1950 dummies.
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Table W6: Barro-Lee Education Attainment Data
Percentage of primary schooling attained 5 years later by adults 15-19 years old
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rivalry 3.049* 3.243
[1.844] [2.571]
Democracy -0.365** -0.346** -0.196 -0.198
[0.146] [0.153] [0.123] [0.122]
Rivalry*Democracy 0.452** 0.893***
[0.206] [0.257]
Relative army of rivals -0.095
[0.558]
War in previous 10 years 7.032***
[2.090]
War in 10 years*Democracy -0.164
[0.257]
Won war in previous 10 years 5.247*
[2.882]
Lost war in previous 10 years 9.188***
[2.619]
Won war in 10 years*Democracy 0.241
[0.349]
Lost war in 10 years*Democracy -0.338
[0.315]
Military expenditure p.c. 0.006 -0.001 0.005 0.005
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Government expenditure p.c. -0.002** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 1114 952 1114 1114
R-squared 0.112 0.098 0.116 0.122
Notes: All specifications include time and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets.
***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1.
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